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QUALITY OVER QUANTITY: REEXAMINING THE LINK 
BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND JOB CREATION
ADAM SETH LITWIN AND PHILLIP H. PHAN*
Although much has been written about the quantity of jobs created 
by entrepreneurs, scholars have yet to examine the quality of these 
jobs. In this article, the authors begin to address this important issue 
by examining nearly 5,000 businesses that began operations in 2004. 
They investigate the extent to which nascent employers provide 
what many think of as quality jobs—those offering health care cover-
age and a retirement plan. The authors find that because of small 
scale, constrained resources, and protection from institutional pres-
sures, start-up companies do not provide their employees with either 
of these proxies for job quality, and their likelihood of offering 
health or retirement benefits increases only marginally over their 
first six years of operation. The finding that entrepreneurs’ impres-
sive record of job creation is not matched by a similarly impressive 
outcome with respect to job quality challenges policymakers to en-
sure that entrepreneurs are encouraged to create quality employ-
ment opportunities in the course of creating new businesses.
Few challenge the conventional wisdom that small business is the chief engine of job creation in the United States. This belief becomes espe-
cially salient in media and policy circles during times of economic slow-
down, fueling the prescription that fiscal measures should “prop up” small 
businesses. Researchers have largely corroborated this notion (Birch 1981, 
1987; Neumark, Wall, and Zhang 2011), though recent analyses have 
shown that the job-creating properties typically ascribed to small businesses 
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should actually be attributed to new businesses (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda 2011). That is, entrepreneurs, in particular, deserve much if not 
all of the credit for job creation over the 25-year period beginning in 1980 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2009).
Although much has been written on the quantity of jobs created by new 
ventures, scholars have yet to examine the quality of these jobs. To date, 
the policy conversation has focused on ways the U.S. economy can respond 
to low-cost competition from overseas, by bolstering emerging “high-tech” 
industries like biotechnology or “green” energy or by reviving the nation’s 
once-prospering manufacturing base, for example—both of which imply 
the promotion of entrepreneurship (Osterman and Shulman 2011). But, 
scholars have yet to answer a fundamental question about the quality of 
the jobs that could emerge from these or other policy choices: Are the 
jobs created by entrepreneurs “quality jobs,” that is, sustainable employ-
ment relationships that truly improve the economic fortunes of their in-
cumbents, their families, and by extension, the nation’s overall economic 
well-being?
This article attempts to address this important issue. We draw on data 
from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) to analyze the labor market behav-
ior of nearly 5,000 businesses that began operations in 2004. The richness 
of these panel microdata allows us to examine the extent to which nascent 
employers provide what many think of as the bedrock of a “real job”—
health care coverage and a retirement plan (Kalleberg 2011: 123). We 
find support for theory linking the typical ascriptions of new businesses—
small scale, constrained resources, and protection from institutional pres-
sures—to the lack of health and pension benefits. More important, we 
find that the likelihood of start-ups offering health or retirement benefits 
increases only slightly over their first five to six years of operation. Scale 
appears to be the dominant driver of job quality for new businesses, as 
larger start-ups behave much like similarly sized established firms with re-
spect to benefits.
Though our research is intended to establish only a baseline understand-
ing of the quality of jobs created through entrepreneurship, the findings 
suggest the value of a nuanced approach to job creation policy. Aside from 
distilling the findings into policy and research implications, we offer some 
ideas for deepening the economic analysis of job quality determinants in 
new ventures.
Entrepreneurship and Job Quality
Entrepreneurial Job Creation
While one could argue that U.S. economic policy has sought to bolster do-
mestic entrepreneurship since at least as far back as Alexander Hamilton’s 
vision for a “modern economy,” the current economic policy favoring small 
business began with Congress’s passage of the Small Business Act of 1953. 
The law created the Small Business Administration (SBA), predicated on 
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the notion that “small business is critical to our economic recovery and 
strength, to building America’s future, and to helping the United States 
compete in today’s global marketplace.”1
Interestingly, the foundation for a link between small business and job 
creation came more than a quarter century later with the work of David 
Birch (1981, 1987). His initial research, relying on data from the first half of 
the 1970s, underpinned his claim that two-thirds of all net new jobs were 
created by businesses with 20 or fewer employees, and that more than four 
out of five new jobs were created by businesses with 100 or fewer employees 
(1981). In a follow-up analysis of data from the period 1981 to 1985, he ar-
gued that the connection had grown stronger and that nearly 90% of em-
ployment growth over that period could be attributed to businesses with 20 
or fewer employees (1987).
Though Birch’s findings regarding size have drawn criticism (e.g., Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996; Harrison 1997), they are routinely used to 
justify favorable regulation, tax incentives, and other government support 
for small businesses (Neumark et al. 2011). While improved data and tech-
niques for analyzing them have tempered the magnitude of Birch’s initial 
findings, it still appears that small firms and establishments create more jobs 
than do large businesses, and at least in the manufacturing and service sec-
tors, establishment size is negatively associated with job creation (Neumark 
et al. 2011). Nonetheless, accepting the apparent correlation between es-
tablishment size and job creation, John Haltiwanger and colleagues (e.g., 
Davis et al. 1996; Haltiwanger et al. 2011) showed that the employment 
growth effects that had been attributed to size should more rightfully be at-
tributed to the interaction of firm size and firm age, consistent with man-
agement studies linking new business formation to job creation (e.g., 
Dencker, Gruber, and Shah 2009). In fact, the analysis of John Haltiwanger, 
Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda (2009), based on very fine-grained data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, concluded that excluding jobs from new ven-
tures, the annual rate of employment growth between 1980 and 2005 would 
have been negative. Follow-up research illustrated that the best way to un-
derstand the relationship between entrepreneurship and employment 
growth was to think in terms of stocks and flows: while start-ups account for 
just 3% of total employment, they are responsible for the creation of one 
out of every five new jobs (2011).
The Notion of Job Quality
Even if one accepts the link between entrepreneurship and the quantity of 
jobs created, it does not necessarily follow that a policy-driven tide that 
boosts entrepreneurs’ demand for labor necessarily lifts all boats. This dis-
connect results from the observation that not all jobs are created equal. 
Traditionally, a “job” meant one had entered into a permanent, long-term 
employment relationship, an exchange that essentially guaranteed a worker 
1 See http://www.sba.gov/content/mission-statement-0 (accessed October 1, 2011).
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access to health insurance and a pension or retirement plan2 (Kochan and 
Litwin 2011)—benefits that in other advanced industrial economies are typ-
ically borne by the state or guaranteed by regulation. Today, the word “job” 
need not conjure up notions of a “standard” employment relationship at all, 
as 30% of workers in the United States engage in “nonstandard” employ-
ment, which is inclusive of independent contractors, employment with con-
tracting companies and temporary help agencies, part-time workers, and 
on-call/day workers (Kalleberg et al. 1997). Even when one is party to a 
conventional or standard employment relationship, to assume that it comes 
with health insurance and a retirement plan—the two benefits we use to as-
sess “job quality”—is no longer safe. As we later explain in more detail, in 
the United States about 60% of employers offer their full-time employees 
some form of health care coverage, and fewer than half of all employers 
economy-wide offer their full-time workers any form of retirement plan (Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics 2011).
Admittedly, one can imagine some businesses or even entire sectors offer-
ing psychologically rewarding work even if it does not come with health care 
coverage or employer-sponsored retirement plans. Furthermore, by focus-
ing solely on employers, one is assuredly ignoring the supply-side, that is, 
worker-related, drivers of benefits. For instance, some workers may be will-
ing to forego benefits, either because they prefer to self-insure (younger 
workers are more likely to fall into this category) and receive total compen-
sation in cash or because they can access these benefits—health care, in 
particular—through a spouse or partner. Along the same lines, there could 
be unobserved differences in worker quality between businesses, so that the 
lack of benefits as a component of total compensation is not an indicator of 
poor job quality but of worker productivity. Though the potential biases 
arising from inattention to the supply side can and will be mitigated statisti-
cally, for example, by controlling for industry, we will return to this issue in 
our discussion of this study’s limitations.
Having acknowledged the potential drawbacks to our approach, we can 
still substantiate our economic definition of job quality on a number of 
grounds. First, from a policy perspective, we know that workers in the United 
States obtain health insurance and retirement benefits primarily through 
employment (Kalleberg 2011), suggesting that workers in jobs without these 
benefits suffer from a depressed standard of living (Kalleberg and Van 
Buren 1996). Moreover, since our concern is with the low end of the quality 
spectrum, it makes sense for us to focus on what Frederick Herzberg’s (1968 
[2003]) classic treatment would label “hygiene factors”—those related to 
basic human and biological needs, namely survival, and not those that moti-
vate people to grow and to achieve, which tend to be psychological in 
2 We use the word “pension” and the phrase “retirement plan” interchangeably. For this article, “pen-
sion” does not imply a traditional, defined-benefit plan, as it has come to be understood colloquially. 
Rather, a “pension” can be any sort of retirement plan—defined-benefit, defined-contribution, or a hy-
brid thereof.
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nature. Arguably, health and economic security are such hygiene factors. 
Second, from a statistical perspective, Arne Kalleberg and Mark Van Buren’s 
(1996) empirical study revealed that health care coverage and pensions 
(along with some forms of paid leave) load onto a single theoretical con-
struct or factor, whereas benefits for dependents (e.g., childcare assistance) 
and participatory benefits (e.g., flextime and profit-sharing) load onto sepa-
rate factors that are not driven by the same determinants. Therefore, while 
narrow, our definition of job quality is theoretically conservative from the 
standpoint of the literature.
Determinants of Job Quality
If it were the case that new businesses create low-quality jobs, what would 
explain it? The key is to first identify the drivers of job quality likely to be 
absent in new firms. Then, show that these drivers explain variation in the 
quality of jobs created by entrepreneurs, and that those few new firms that 
do exhibit these features more typically associated with established firms, 
indeed, also offer jobs of high quality. Along these lines, received research 
leads us to focus on three factors likely to characterize most new busi-
nesses—scale diseconomies, resource constraints, and a relative lack of insti-
tutional pressures. We believe that each of these will deter entrepreneurs 
from offering high-quality jobs, but those few new businesses that manage 
to achieve scale economies, demonstrate resource slack, or are genuinely 
subject to institutional pressures to conform to employment practice norms 
will more likely go “against the grain” by offering health care benefits and 
pensions.
Scale Diseconomies
The size distribution of employers and the distribution of employment 
across these employers are well-known and largely uncontroversial features 
of the U.S. labor market. On the one hand, the size distribution of employ-
ers is radically skewed, with the vast number of businesses employing fewer 
than 20 people. On the other hand, just a handful of firms employ thou-
sands of workers, but that handful is large enough such that these truly large 
workplaces account for more than half of all employment in the United 
States.3 Researchers typically consider the impact of workplace size on labor 
market outcomes against this backdrop. Therefore, although little or no 
research has been published on the quality of jobs created by new employ-
ers, just as in the case with the job creation literature, a fair bit of research 
exists on the quality of jobs in small firms relative to that in large firms. This 
literature can inform expectations regarding the link between entrepre-
neurship and job quality, as long as one is willing to accept that “small” often 
3 In 2008, 50.6% of all paid employees in the United States worked for the 0.3% of enterprises that 
employed more than 500 employees (Bureau of the Census 2008).
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includes workplaces of 500 or more employees—easily many orders of mag-
nitude greater than the 2 to 3 employee mean size for a brand new or emerg-
ing business. Nonetheless, whether based on data from individuals reporting 
access to benefits through their employers or data from employers report-
ing their offering of different sorts of benefits to their employees, received 
findings are conclusive and well-encapsulated in Charles Brown, James 
Hamilton, and James Medoff’s (1990) extensive analysis.4 Their findings re-
vealed that jobs created by small firms, relative to those created by large 
firms, offer less generous health care and retirement benefits. What is more, 
they showed that these missing fringe benefits are not compensated for with 
higher wages, better working conditions, or greater employer investments 
in training, as small employers score significantly lower on all of these di-
mensions as well.
A number of other large-sample studies have shown that large firms are 
more likely than small firms to provide benefits to their workers (e.g., 
 Rebitzer 1986; Kalleberg and Van Buren 1996; Belman and Groshen 1998; 
Hollister 2004), namely health care coverage and pensions, and that the 
negative association between size and employee benefits is especially pro-
nounced for those benefits that impose a direct cost on employers (Knoke 
1994). In fact, Shelley MacDermid, Leon Litchfield, and Marcie Pitt- 
Catsouphes (1999) showed that larger companies are more apt to offer all 
but one of 22 benefits asked about on their survey, the one exception being 
on-the-job training.
Distinguishing size from life cycle stage is critically important—“smallness” 
from “newness” (Edwards and Ram 2010)—yet, the fact is that virtually all 
emerging firms are small at inception (Cardon and Stevens 2004). Therefore, 
we can begin theorizing on the drivers of job quality in emerging ventures by 
considering the impact of scale, in particular, actual scale economies (or dis-
economies) in production. As noted above, much of the received theory in 
this vein focuses on compensation, namely wages, and attempts to explain 
why large firms would pay more than small ones. This notion can be adapted 
to explain why small firms would be less apt to offer high-quality jobs.
First, it is certainly the case that larger firms are characterized by greater 
capital intensity, leading some to argue, the direct effect of which is to make 
job vacancies—which make for idling capital—more costly (Oi 1983; Idson 
and Feaster 1990). Along with high capital intensity comes production pro-
cesses that are highly interdependent in nature (Griliches 1969; Rebitzer 
and Taylor 1995), requiring that workers be especially dependable and dis-
ciplined, since one unproductive worker can be enough to reduce produc-
tivity across the line. Similarly, large-scale operations create managerial 
4 While 500 employees may seem like a high cutoff point for defining a “small business,” such a thresh-
old is commonly used. The SBA, for example, specifies its size thresholds by industry, ranging from as low 
as 100 workers for wholesale trade to 1,500 for petroleum refineries and telecommunications. Nonethe-
less, Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff’s (1990) conclusions were not sensitive to their specific choice of 
threshold.
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challenges for monitoring and supervising workers, prompting employers 
to boost remuneration as a “carrot” to prevent shirking (Oi 1983; Rebitzer 
1993; Fairris and Alston 1994). Conversely, one would expect that newer 
firms, to the extent they are characterized by lower capital intensity, and 
therefore, more segmented or disjointed production processes and cer-
tainly greater ease of monitoring and supervision, are less likely to feel the 
need to offer their workers a generous package of fringe benefits.
A separate line of thinking with respect to scale diseconomies comes from 
dual labor market theory (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 1973). This ap-
proach suggests that new firms, particularly to the extent they are small, 
have less scope for long-term attachment to employees (Reilly 1995). In the 
case of small firms, this could be because they lack internal labor markets 
(ILMs), and thus, opportunities for advancement (Hollister 2004). This fact 
makes it especially unlikely that an employer would invest in benefits 
with high, upfront costs and more distant, long-term benefits (Cardon and 
Stevens 2004).5
At least two other arguments can be made for the relationship between 
scale economies and job quality. First, larger employers are likely to have 
more bargaining power vis-à-vis their vendors, enabling them to acquire 
production inputs—including benefits for their workforce—on a less ex-
pensive basis per employee. And, of course, having more employees across 
which to spread the fixed costs of initiating any particular benefit will also 
reduce the cost per employee (Sels et al. 2006a, 2006b).
In short, we expect the size of a new venture to be a positive predictor of 
whether it offers health care and retirement benefits, even after controlling 
for other determinants of job quality. Moreover, with all of the many ways 
that scale can drive job quality, we expect size to be the key variable distin-
guishing the behavior of these new employers from that of all employers 
across the economy.
Hypothesis 1a: The size of an emerging business will be positively associated 
with the probability that it offers its full-time employees a health insur-
ance plan.
Hypothesis 1b: The size of an emerging business will be positively associated 
with the probability that it offers its full-time employees a retirement plan.
Constrained Resources
Closely related to scale economies in production, the degree of resource 
slack characterizing an entrepreneurial business can also impact the quality 
of the jobs it creates. While the notion of “slack” goes at least as far back as 
Chester Barnard (1938), James March and Herbert Simon (1958) were the 
5 Interestingly, in her attempt to disentangle the drivers of the firm-size wage effect (FSWE), Hollister 
(2004) found the most support for the ILM argument, in particular, since changes in the FSWE appear 
to co-vary with a decline in her measure of ILM incidence.
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first to use the term explicitly in the organizational context (Tan and Peng 
2003). Today, the most commonly used definition of the general slack con-
struct comes from Bourgeois (1981: 29), who claimed that “slack” “conveys 
the notion of a cushion of excess resources available in an organization that 
will either solve many organizational problems or facilitate the pursuit of 
goals outside the realm of those dictated by optimization principles.”
Many others have since advanced the concept by identifying different 
forms of slack, generally in an effort to demonstrate differences in anteced-
ents (e.g., Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, and Tansik 1988), or the differential 
 impact of resource slack on strategic exploration or exploitation (Voss, 
 Sirdeshmukh, and Voss 2008) or other types of organizational behaviors 
(Thompson 1967). The specific form of slack that we consider here is what 
the literature labels “financial” (e.g., Voss et al. 2008), “unabsorbed” (e.g., 
Singh 1986; Nohria and Gulati 1996), or “high-discretion” slack (e.g., 
 Sharfman et al. 1988). In short, we are referring to liquid, often cash or 
cash-equivalent, resources that owners or managers have at their disposal 
for responding to competitive pressures. And, we expect that new businesses 
are unlikely to exhibit an excess of such resources.
This phenomenon has been labeled “resource poverty” (Welsh and White 
1981). In particular, an emerging business’s dependence on start-up capital 
makes it less likely to have retained earnings or other cash reserves from 
which to finance those employee benefits requiring upfront costs, such as 
the payment of health care premiums or the establishment of retirement 
benefit accounts (Cardon and Stevens 2004). As William Dennis (2000: 253) 
stated, “New businesses . . . usually need all the capital their owners can raise 
to finance their ventures and have little to spare for expenditures like health 
insurance or pensions.” In sum, as was the case with scale, we expect that 
new employers are at a disadvantage relative to more established ones with 
respect to resource slack. Therefore, those few entrepreneurs who manage 
to accumulate resources should be more likely to offer jobs of high quality.
Hypothesis 2a: The degree of resource slack in an emerging business will be 
positively associated with the probability that it offers its full-time employ-
ees a health insurance plan.
Hypothesis 2b: The degree of resource slack in an emerging business will be 
positively associated with the probability that it offers its full-time employ-
ees a retirement plan.
Lack of Institutional Pressures
The pressures of institutionalization (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) serve as a final prod for employers to offer quality jobs. 
Indeed, the degree of institutional pressure felt by a new business is likely to 
be low for a number of reasons. First, small firms are much less likely to be 
shaped by their national environments than are otherwise similar larger 
firms (Wever 1995; Edwards and Ram 2010). That is, the corner “mom and 
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pop” is less likely to be picketed for the treatment of its employees than is 
the local Walmart. Therefore, to the extent that providing high-quality jobs 
to full-time employees is still a norm, which likely differs substantially by in-
dustry, newer and smaller employers would feel less pressure to comply. Sec-
ond, new businesses, again, largely pursuant to their small size, tend to be 
less visible to and therefore receive less attention from regulators, the 
media, and the public (Powell 1991; Goodstein 1994). Similarly, to the ex-
tent new ventures are less likely to appear on the “radar screen” of labor 
organizers, they are less likely to be unionization targets, attenuating the 
institutional pressures that have long been shown to result from the threat 
of unionization (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Leicht 1989; Western 
and Rosenfeld 2011).
Even within a sample limited to new businesses, at least two sources of 
variation occur in the degree to which organizations are subject to norma-
tive pressures. First, public policy in the United States favors the employ-
ment relationship as the primary conduit for health care coverage and 
retirement benefits. Therefore, those emerging businesses that serve 
local, state, and federal governments, and so consequently are more likely 
to be visible to these regulatory bodies (Baron et al. 1986; Ingram and 
 Simons 1995)—not to mention to their respective communities—would 
be more likely to comply with the normative pressure to promote social 
welfare by providing jobs of high quality (Oliver 1991; Osterman and 
Shulman 2011). Second, over time, young firms must find ways to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of trading partners, potential employees, regula-
tors, and customers, and must do so on a relatively thin record of experi-
ence and performance (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Cardon and Stevens 
2004). As a result, those fledgling businesses that survive will be increas-
ingly likely to submit to institutional pressures, irrespective of size, in an 
effort to mimic successful, larger firms.6 This facilitates their gaining ac-
cess to the employee base, customer base, and other resources necessary 
for continued growth (Wholey and Brittain 1986; Aldrich and Fiol 1994). 
As a result, one can construe time itself as a proxy for the extent to which 
institutional pressure bears down on new employers. The key point is that 
new businesses generally will not face institutional pressure to the same 
degree as do established businesses. Those that do will be more likely 
than otherwise similar businesses to offer health and pension plans to 
their employees.
Hypothesis 3a: The level of institutional pressure confronting an emerging 
business will be positively associated with the probability that it offers its 
full-time employees a health insurance plan.
6 Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2007) found that businesses come to resemble one another in their 
behavior as employers, in the sense that their pay and productivity and the skill composition of their re-
spective workforces converge as new businesses survive and mature. Such mimicry is endemic to institu-
tionalization processes.
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Hypothesis 3b: The level of institutional pressure confronting an emerging 
business will be positively associated with the probability that it offers its 
full-time employees a retirement plan.
Data and Methods
The Kauffman Firm Survey
Our analysis relies on the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a panel of 4,928 
businesses founded in 2004 and surveyed annually from 2005 to 2010 (i.e., 
six observations per business). Each year’s survey is administered beginning 
in June of the following year (e.g., June of 2005 for the 2004 data). The KFS 
is designed and administered by the nonprofit Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation with guidance from Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. Con-
ducted by way of the Internet or by phone, the survey collects detailed data 
regarding the founding and the founders of the firm as well as financing 
methods, capital investments, and investments in intangible assets. It also 
canvasses for accounting data and information on intellectual property and 
business strategy, among other things. What makes it especially attractive for 
this study is the large number of very small businesses included in the sam-
ple, especially important for isolating the impact of scale at sizes far below 
the small business size thresholds in the extant literature. Also germane to 
this study is the rich set of items related to business organization and human 
resources (HR). In particular, surveyors ask a set of questions that allow re-
searchers to construct measures not only of the size and composition of the 
workforce but of the nature of the employment benefits offered to workers. 
In particular, we can determine whether and when each nascent employer 
offers health insurance and retirement benefits.
Table 1 shows the industry breakdown of the founding cohort of busi-
nesses, both as an absolute number and as a percentage of the total initial 
sample. Owing to Kauffman’s interest in innovation, the survey deliberately 
oversamples businesses in high-tech industries, using a stratified sampling 
methodology. This method has implications for our estimation strategy, to 
be explained below. The response rate for the initial survey round was 43%, 
with rates significantly higher in subsequent years (e.g., 82% of those con-
tributing data in the baseline year respond in year four).7
Variables
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are described in the top panel of Table 2. In each 
survey round, respondents are asked, “As of December 31 [of last year], did 
[your business] offer full-time employees or owners a health insurance plan 
7 For more information on the KFS, see Robb et al. (2010).
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either through the business or an association?” Respondents answer this 
question “yes” or “no,” and an affirmative answer is assigned the value of 1 
while the negative becomes the referent category. The same question is 
posed and parameterized analogously for retirement benefits, that is, “a re-
tirement plan such as profit sharing, pension, including 401K, annuity, 
Keogh, etc.” These questions are not posed to those businesses that, in a 
given year, had a sole owner and no employees. This leads to a sizable num-
ber of missing observations—1,841 in the year of founding—though this 
number diminishes to below 750 for 2009, the last year for which we have 
data.
Independent Variables
Testing the hypotheses calls for measures of organizational scale, resources, 
and institutional pressures that could explain variation in the extent to 
which new employers proffer health and pension benefits. Information on 
how these variables, all of which are time-varying, are constructed appears 
in the bottom panel of Table 2. Hypotheses 1a and 1b, in particular, call for 
a size measure. While organizational size takes on a number of meanings 
and, therefore, should be operationalized differently in varying contexts 
(Kimberly 1976), Arne Kalleberg and Mark Van Buren (1996) argued that 
Table 1. Industry Composition of the Baseline 
Sample of Emerging Businesses
Industry n
Percentage of 
initial sample (%)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 40 0.81
Mining 5 0.1
Utilities 6 0.12
Construction 390 7.91
Manufacturing 720 14.6
Wholesale Trade 219 4.44
Retail Trade 526 10.67
Transportation and Warehousing 112 2.27
Information 164 3.33
Finance and Insurance 186 3.77
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 177 3.59
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 1,203 24.41
Management of Companies and Enterprises 10 0.2
Administrative and Support and Waste Management 360 7.31
Educational Services 29 0.59
Health Care and Social Assistance 121 2.46
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 105 2.13
Accommodation and Food Services 98 1.99
Other Services (except Public Administration) 454 9.21
Public Administration 3 0.06
Total 4,928 100*
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey baseline year (2004), two-digit NAICS 2002, un-
weighted.
*The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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the number of employees is the most relevant measure of size when study-
ing HR issues. Technically, we also know that the number of employees is 
highly correlated with other facets of size, including assets, sales, profits, 
and output, so that it can be generalized to a broader discussion on scale. 
This line of reasoning is consistent with prior studies of job creation by en-
trepreneurs (e.g., Dencker et al. 2009) as well as received analyses of job 
quality (Hollister 2004). Therefore, we include a linear and quadratic mea-
sure of the number of employees, inclusive of full- and part-time employees, 
but excluding owners and contract workers.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b theorize a link between resource slack and the like-
lihood of a new employer offering health and retirement benefits. There 
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable Definition/Survey item Construction
Dependent variables
Health care coverage “As of December 31 [of last year], did 
[the business] offer full-time employ-
ees or owners a health insurance 
plan either through the business or 
an association?”
Binary variable in which 0 = “no” 
and 1 = “yes.”
Retirement plan “As of December 31 [of last year], did 
[the business] offer full-time employ-
ees or owners a retirement plan such 
as profit sharing, pension, including 
401(k), annuity, Keogh, etc.?”
Binary variable in which 0 = “no” 
and 1 = “yes.”
Independent Variables
Number of employees “Not counting owner(s), on December 
31 [of last year], how many people 
worked for [the business]?”
Continuous variable. Includes all 
full-time and part-time employ-
ees, but excludes all contract 
workers.
Number of employees2 “Not counting owner(s), on December 
31 [of last year], how many people 
worked for [the business]?”
Continuous variable. Squared 
value of Number of employees.
Profitable “What was [the business’s] total profit 
or loss for the [last] calendar year?”
Binary variable set to 1 when prof-
its were positive.
Competitive advantage “In [the survey year], did [the busi-
ness] have a competitive advantage 
over its competitors?”
Binary variable in which 0 = “no” 
and 1 = “yes.”
Patents “Whether assigned by an owner or ob-
tained in some other way, does [the 
business] have any patents?”
Binary variable in which 0 = “no” 
and 1 = “yes.”
Trademarks “Whether assigned by an owner or ob-
tained in some other way, does [the 
business] have any trademarks?”
Binary variable in which 0 = “no” 
and 1 = “yes.”
ln(Government share 
 of total sales)
“What percentage of the business’s 
sales were to government agencies?”
Continuous variable, natural log 
of percentage.
Age Linear time trend Discrete variable in domain [0,5]. 
Set to 0 for the baseline year 
(2004), incrementing by 1 until 
the final year of data (2009).
Age2 Quadratic time trend Discrete variable in domain 
[0,25]. Squared value of Age.
Source: All variables constructed from the public-use version of the Kauffman Firm Survey.
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has been no consensus as to the best ways to measure slack, though a num-
ber of scholars have suggested or relied on financially derived indicators 
(e.g., Nohria and Gulati 1996). Following Bourgeois’s (1981) advice, and 
accepting the coarseness of the measures available to us, we attempt to mea-
sure slack in multiple ways, both objectively and subjectively. Indeed, new 
businesses can “show their cards” in a number of ways with respect to the 
forms of slack with which we are concerned. All of these are tantamount to 
the firm signaling in some way that it earns economic rents. Profitability, for 
example, is a straightforward financial signal that a firm has resources on 
hand to finance the provision of benefits—consistent with one classic defini-
tion of slack as the surplus of income over the costs of production (Cyert 
and March 1963). Therefore, following Dennis (2000), we capture whether 
the firm is profitable. We do so using a dummy variable equal to 1 in profit-
able business-years.
Strategic management theory dictates that firms must have a “strategic 
competitive advantage” if they are to generate sustained economic rents 
(Porter 1980). Coupled with the finding that competitive pressures decay 
with slack (Pfeffer and Leblebici 1973; Pfeffer 1978), one would expect that 
those few new businesses that achieve a strategic competitive advantage are 
better resourced, and therefore, more likely to provide jobs of high quality. 
Consequently, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for those businesses 
claiming to have a strategic competitive advantage in the eyes of the owner-
respondent.
Finally, one might expect that the legally sanctioned market power that 
entrepreneurs and others can secure for their intellectual property might 
also afford them supernormal profits from which to finance the provision of 
higher quality jobs. Therefore, we include two binary terms to account for 
the economic rents that potentially arise from appropriating the returns to 
protected intellectual property. Specifically, we include a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for those businesses that claim to hold one or more patents and 
an analogous binary variable measuring the incidence of trademarks.
The third set of hypotheses theorized a link between institutional pres-
sures and an entrepreneur’s likelihood of offering health and retirement 
benefits. As argued above, the type of customers served by a business will 
influence the quality of its employment relationships. Specifically, those 
businesses serving public sector customers are more likely to experience the 
sorts of institutional pressures that encourage them to offer health and re-
tirement benefits. Therefore, we measure the share of each company’s sales 
attributable to government agencies. This measurement is made using a 
continuous variable, the natural log of the percentage of the business’s sales 
that fall into that category; however, we would have been equally comfort-
able using any transformation that allows for an association that is mono-
tonically increasing, albeit at a decreasing rate.8
8 This required us to re-code the log zero-cases as zeros rather than leaving them as “undefined.” Alter-
native ways of dealing with this issue, such as adding 1 to all observations to avoid zero-cases, yielded 
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Aside from considering the government share of a business’s receipts, we 
measure the age of a business. As argued above, conditional on its survival, 
age or vintage is one assessment of the extent to which the business is sub-
jected to institutional pressures. There are, of course, countless ways to mea-
sure age, the most straightforward of which would be a simple, linear term. 
This measure, however, could be biased downward by the precipitous eco-
nomic slowdown that began in 2008. Therefore, we also include a quadratic 
term to allow for curvilinearity in the relationship between age and job qual-
ity. The linear term begins at 0 for the year of founding with annual incre-
ments until the final year of data, when it takes on the value of 5. Likewise, 
the quadratic term takes on values from 0 to 25.9
Lastly, some of the estimates will include a vector of binary variables to 
control for industry effects at the two-digit NAICS level. These pick up some 
of the general characteristics of labor and product markets within which 
entrepreneurs must operate, including product market concentration, capi-
tal intensity, and profitability (Kalleberg and Van Buren 1996; Holzer, Lane, 
Rosenblum, and Andersson 2011), particularly to the extent that these vari-
ables are neither observed directly at the employer level or are measured 
with error when using observable independent variables as proxies, for in-
stance, scale as a measure of capital intensity. For example, if one believes 
the service sector is generally characterized by high competition in the 
product market and an oversupply of workers in the labor market, one 
would expect these forces, particularly in concert, to have a negative impact 
on observed job quality. Matissa Hollister (2004) also pointed out that in-
dustries face different production technologies, which could impact their 
decisions over offering certain benefits. Finally, as noted above, controlling 
for industry also mitigates any biases that might otherwise arise from our 
singular focus on the demand side of the employment equation.
Methods
Our estimates must predict the likelihood that a business offers its full-time 
employees health insurance and a retirement plan as a function of the 
business’s scale and resources as well as of the institutional pressures the 
business faces. OLS proves insufficient for a number of reasons. To start, 
OLS yields predicted probabilities outside of the [0,1] range as well as re-
siduals of unequal variance (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), problems that are 
similar results. Similarly, other transformations that allowed for a monotonically increasing relationship 
of diminishing magnitude, for example, the square root transformation and the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation, also yielded very comparable results.
9 Of course, whether we iterate our age measure from 0 to 5 or from 1 to 6 makes no difference for 
multivariate estimation. Conceptually, since the businesses are founded in 2004, they are all less than one 
year old on December 31, 2004, the date at which job quality is first assessed. So, for analytical purposes, 
we regard the baseline year as the zero-year and the subsequent year as the first full year of operation. As 
a result, we are technically analyzing businesses over their first five to six years of operations, depending 
on precisely what date in 2004 they were founded.
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well-addressed by logistic or probit regression. Even a standard logit or pro-
bit, however, leaves two additional complications unresolved. First, the lon-
gitudinal nature of the data—up to six observations per business—calls for 
a technique that addresses the dependence structure of the data (Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). At minimum, we could treat the clustering of 
cases as a “nuisance factor” by simply clustering our standard errors. The 
panel nature of the KFS though presents what should be considered more 
of an opportunity than a nuisance. That is, it allows us to take advantage of 
multilevel modeling techniques by estimating job quality over the first five 
to six years of a business’s existence (Singer and Willett 2003), exploiting 
variation between businesses as well as variation within each business unit.10 
Unfortunately, even this robust family of models leaves a critical concern 
unaddressed, which is the complex nature of the original sampling and sub-
sequent, systematic sample attrition arising from the nonrandom failure of 
new ventures. Indeed, received research, including some using the KFS 
data, makes clear that new ventures face a high likelihood of failure (Stinch-
combe 1965; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Smith 2011). Were the likelihood of 
a given employer’s failure, and thus, subsequent disappearance from the 
data set not accounted for, any estimates run on the resulting unbalanced 
panel would likely suffer from so-called survival or attrition bias.
The literature on attrition bias in longitudinal surveys has long been 
available. In general, attrition is defined as the permanent loss of sample 
members from a longitudinal sample. It creates the threat of bias only if 
those units that drop out after the original sample are systematically differ-
ent from those that remain in the sample throughout the observation pe-
riod—six years in our case. If this occurs, the remaining sample, of course, 
represents a population different from the original sample (Cochran 1977). 
Without any correction, estimates would not generalize back to the original 
population of businesses, but rather, to the subpopulation of surviving busi-
nesses. Three common methods are available for addressing this statistical 
challenge (Farhat 2012). First, surveyors can attempt to track every single 
participant through repeated attempts to contact them, preventing attrition 
in the first place. Indeed, KFS surveyors do this. The issue of businesses truly 
disappearing is a rather minor one in this context, however, as just 147 of the 
4,928 businesses (about 3%) truly vanish from the data set without any expla-
nation over the entire six years’ worth of data collection. The real challenge 
arises from those businesses that surveyors are able to locate and include in 
the survey wave, but whose data are missing, because they have voluntarily or 
involuntarily ceased operations. By the sixth year of data, this number rises 
to 1,747, or about 35% of the original sample of new businesses. This leaves 
10 Not surprisingly, more variation occurs between businesses than within them; nonetheless, plenty of 
within-business variation occurs as well. In the case of health insurance, Vbetween = .39 and Vwithin = .24. In 
the case of pensions,  Vbetween = .28 and Vwithin = .20. Furthermore, using health insurance as an example, 
an examination of transition probabilities reveals that about 12% of those not offering the benefit in a 
given year will offer it the following year, and that about 16% of those offering it in a given year will not 
offer it the following year.
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two alternatives. One is to estimate a two-stage, sample selection model like 
that proposed by Heckman (1976, 1979) or, perhaps, a less-restrictive semi-
parametric alternative (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Guo and Fraser 2010; 
Wooldridge 2010). Instead, one can use complex sample weighting to ad-
just for systematic sample attrition in each subsequent wave of the survey, 
whereby weights are recalculated and reassigned to each surviving sample 
unit in each subsequent round to ensure that each wave’s resulting sample 
continues to represent the original population from which the original sam-
ple was drawn.
A number of reasons explain why we have opted to rely on weights (in 
addition to the surveyors’ considerable efforts to track participants) rather 
than on sample selection models. First, the effective use of a sample selec-
tion model requires, among other things, the identification of at least one 
variable that drives firm survival (“relevance”) without having any systematic 
relationship with the dependent variables of interest (“exogeneity”) (Reiss 
2011), a condition that is generally difficult to substantiate in practice 
(Wooldridge 2010). Second, in those rare situations in which survey design-
ers foresaw the survival issue at the time of survey design, as in the case of 
the KFS, estimates that rely on weighting and re-weighting with each subse-
quent survey wave perform better than two-stage estimates on unweighted 
data (McGuigan, Ellickson, Hays, and Bell 1997; Farhat 2012). This results 
because the weights map the sample in each follow-up survey back to repre-
sent the original sample from the baseline year. In the baseline year itself, 
weights are developed to account for unequal sampling probabilities that 
arise from intentional oversampling of some businesses and undersampling 
of others, that is, sample selection bias. Then, with each subsequent admin-
istration of the survey, weights are first adjusted to compensate for nonre-
sponse, meaning attrition, and adjusted once more to ensure the surviving 
population represents the original population. This suggests that by relying 
on probability weights, we are not only addressing survival bias. In addition 
to ensuring that our estimates generalize back to the original sample of 
businesses, the weights ensure that estimates pertaining to the original sam-
ple—which strategically oversampled some firms and undersampled oth-
ers—also generalize to the intended original population of new businesses. 
Even if we were only examining the original cross section of firms, we would 
want to use survey weights to ensure generalizability to the entire universe 
of new ventures in 2004. Therefore, relying on weights works to address 
sampling bias as well as the larger challenge arising from survival bias. Fi-
nally, incorporating survey design features also enables us to partially relax 
the usual assumption of conditional independence across all observations, 
noted above, which would otherwise have to be done by estimating a multi-
level model and/or clustered standard errors (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 
2004). The upshot is that we essentially estimate two separate, straightfor-
ward logit models—one for health insurance and another for pensions. 
These models rely on the probability weights that have been constructed by 
the surveyors to account both for sampling and for response bias in the 
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baseline survey and re-constructed with each survey wave to account for the 
systematic failure of new businesses, and thus, their permanent exit from 
the data set.11
Results
Table 3 provides means, standard deviations, and pair-wise correlations for 
the variables called on in the subsequent analyses. Note that less than one-
third of the establishments (i.e., establishment-years) in the sample—31%—
offer any form of health insurance to their full-time employees. About half 
as many businesses—15%—offer some form of a pension or retirement 
plan. Businesses in the sample are quite small, employing about 2.3 workers, 
on average, which is consistent with an almost axiomatic notion motivating 
this analysis. That is, new employers are likely to have small-scale operations, 
highlighting the need to isolate the impact of smallness from that of new-
ness. Furthermore, that the standard deviation of size is more than twice the 
mean highlights the severe left skew of the variable. The four binary mea-
sures of resource slack offer a less clear picture of the degree to which these 
businesses are resource-constrained. Just 10% of the respondents reported 
that they own a trademark that can be leveraged for supernormal profits, 
and just 3% hold at least one patent. More than two out of every five busi-
ness-years in the sample were profitable ones, and more than 60% of re-
spondents believe they hold a “strategic competitive advantage.” Since 
surveyors actually define the phrase for respondents, entrepreneurs are 
clearly articulating that they believe they have unique, profit-making poten-
tial not afforded to their competitors.
With respect to institutional pressures, fewer than 7% of receipts come 
from public sector customers, though the large standard deviation suggests 
it could be a substantial share of receipts for some businesses in the sample. 
It also reveals the left skew of its distribution, much as in the case of size, as 
11 While we have gone to great lengths to mitigate biases resulting from sampling and survival, our re-
sults are robust to methods that ignore sampling issues altogether.
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
for Study Sample of Emerging Businesses
# Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Health care coverage  .31 .46 1.00
2 Retirement plan  .15 .36 .40 1.00
3 Number of employees 2.27 4.83 .38 .30 1.00
4 Profitable  .45 .50 .10 .11 .04 1.00
5 Competitive advantage  .62 .49 .10 .06 .10 .04 1.00
6 Patents  .03 .17 .09 .07 .08 –.09 .12 1.00
7 Trademarks  .10 .30 .10 .07 .13 .07 .16 .26 1.00
8 Government share of total sales 6.83 20.49 .10 .13 .07 .08 .02 .05 –.01 1.00
9 Age 2.41 1.74 .09 .12 .11 .11 –.09 .01 –.02 .08
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, all years, unweighted.
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most businesses attribute no business at all to public sector customers. This 
suggests that on average, these businesses are not subject to much norma-
tive pressure from customers. The mean value for the time trend, 2.41 on a 
0 to 5 scale, implies fewer observations at the end of the six-year observation 
period than there were at the beginning. Inferring anything from this mean 
measure alone is difficult, other than the fact that businesses often fail and 
subsequently exit the sample. As noted earlier, this inference is consistent 
with the high failure rate of new ventures (Carroll and Hannan 2000; Smith 
2011), and the multivariate analyses account for the potential attrition bias 
that might otherwise result from this phenomenon. Finally, none of the vari-
ables in the study are strongly correlated with one another. The two depen-
dent variables appear to co-vary, and size is positively pair-wise correlated 
with both of the benefits measures. There also appears to be a positive as-
sociation between the two variables measuring the incidence of intellectual 
property.
Even in advance of the multivariate analysis, obvious patterns begin to 
emerge between each of the explanatory variables and the two measures of 
job quality. These patterns are illustrated in Table 4, which presents mean 
values for the independent variables in the year of founding—2004. Aside 
from looking only at the baseline sample, it calculates the observed sample 
means separately according to whether a business offers health insurance 
and whether it offers a pension plan. Note that all differences-in-means go 
in the hypothesized direction, and all are statistically significant, most at 
p < .001. Those new businesses offering health care report, on average, about 
5.4 employees, whereas those who do not offer health insurance employ 
fewer than 2 workers. Similarly, those businesses offering a retirement plan 
in their year of founding have about 6 employees, on average, compared 
with 2.3 workers for those ventures not offering any form of retirement plan 
to their full-time staff. In our sample, profitable new businesses and those 
new businesses claiming to hold a competitive advantage are more likely 
to offer each of the two employee benefits used to assess job quality. In the 
case of profitability and pensions, the difference is 15 percentage points. 
Table 4. Mean Values of Explanatory Variables 
by Job Quality Status for the Baseline Sample 
of Emerging Businesses in the Year of Founding
Variable
Health care Retirement
No Yes t-test No Yes t-test
Number of employees 1.77 5.36 (–20.00)*** 2.34 6.07 (–12.94)***
Profitable .41 .51 (–4.84)*** .42 .57 (–4.48)***
Competitive advantage .66 .75 (–4.65)*** .68 .74 (–2.13)***
Patents .04 .07 (–3.18)*** .05 .07 (–1.73)***
Trademarks .14 .23 (–5.86)*** .16 .24 (–3.49)***
Government share of total sales 4.38 6.50 (–2.81)*** 4.31 11.21 (–5.94)***
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey baseline year (2004), unweighted.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed test.
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Likewise, those businesses holding intellectual property in the form of pat-
ents and trademarks are more likely to offer both health and retirement 
benefits. And, there appears to be a link between the government share of a 
business’s receipts and job quality. In the case of pensions, in particular, 
those businesses that did not offer a retirement plan credited about 4.3% of 
their sales to public sector customers, compared with an average of 11.2% 
for those businesses offering the benefit.12
In sum, it appears that size, resources, and one of our measures of institu-
tional pressure are all positively associated with job quality, in accordance 
with the hypotheses. However, these are simply observed sample means for 
a single year. They do not test the hypotheses simultaneously nor do they 
allow us to follow businesses over time. While survival bias is not an issue 
when examining only the baseline sample—a single year’s worth of data—
these do not account for the complex design of the survey sample. And, of 
course, observed means are almost certainly, at least in part, a reflection of 
the industry composition of the baseline sample. We must wait until the 
multivariate analysis to tackle these issues.
Before turning to the multivariate analyses from which it will be either 
difficult or impossible to tease out interindustry effects, considering the dif-
ferences in job quality between industries in the baseline sample is worth-
while. This step is facilitated by the calculation of benefits offer rates shown 
in Table 5. Keep in mind that in all cases, the cell sizes are smaller than 
those that appear in Table 1 because the strategic oversampling of high-tech 
industries implies the undersampling of others. Furthermore, as noted ear-
lier, benefits incidence is never canvassed for those firms that have just one 
owner and no employees, which account for 38% of the sample in the year 
of founding. Therefore, the industry-level characteristics must be taken with 
a grain of salt given some excessively small cell sizes.
With those caveats, we first notice a fair bit of interindustry variation in 
both measures of job quality. Excluding those industries with negligible cell 
counts, wholesale trade is the industry most likely to offer its full-time em-
ployees health insurance in the year of founding. It does so 31% of the time, 
the only industry to achieve the overall, multiyear sample average reported 
in Table 3. Not surprisingly, in economy-wide data, wholesale trade is also 
one of the better-paying of the industries at the two-digit level (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2011), suggesting that when the fixed cost of health care 
premiums make up a smaller share of total compensation, businesses are 
more likely to offer the benefit. What belies this inference, however, is ac-
commodation and food services, which also happens to be the biggest cre-
ator of jobs in the data set (Stangler and Litan 2009). In economy-wide data, 
this industry pays its workers less than any other (Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis 2011). Yet, it still offers its full-time workers health care coverage with 
.29 probability in the KFS data. Real estate and leasing, whose average pay 
12 Since no variation in business age can be measured for a single year’s worth of data, the variable 
necessarily gets dropped from this analysis.
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falls roughly in the middle of the industry distribution, offered health care 
benefits to its full-time employees only 10% of the time in the year of founding.
With respect to pensions, notice that in the year of founding, no industry 
quite reaches the overall, multiyear mean of 15% reported in Table 3. Aside 
from industries with excessively small cell counts, penetration is highest at 
13% in the professional, scientific, and technical services industry. On the 
other side of the spectrum, other service industries (except public adminis-
tration) offer full-time employees retirement plans just 4% of the time. Fi-
nally, note from the bottom row of Table 5 that in the year of founding, 24% 
of new businesses offered health insurance and 8% offered a retirement 
plan. This serves as early support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b since these num-
bers are less than the multiyear sample averages displayed in Table 3. Hav-
ing taken stock of interindustry differences, recall that some of the 
multivariate estimates, in particular, the fully specified models on which we 
will focus, include two-digit industry dummies, and thus, control for unob-
served differences between industries.
Turning now to the multivariate analyses, Tables 6 and 7 present the ex-
ponentiated logistic regression estimates, that is, odds ratios, for health in-
surance and pensions, respectively. In each case, the first four columns 
exclude the vector of two-digit industry dummies, while the second four 
columns include them, so that Models 5 to 8 represent “within-industry” es-
timates. With respect to the analysis of health insurance in Table 6, the esti-
mates in Model 1 imply that the probability of an establishment offering 
Table 5. Job Quality by Industry for the Baseline Sample 
of Emerging Businesses in the Year of Founding
Industry n
Proportion with 
health care coverage
Proportion with 
retirement plan
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 26 .27 .08
Mining 2 .50 .00
Utilities 2 .00 .00
Construction 228 .28 .09
Manufacturing 521 .28 .08
Wholesale Trade 145 .31 .10
Retail Trade 338 .18 .06
Transportation and Warehousing 73 .22 .07
Information 86 .26 .05
Finance and Insurance 137 .25 .10
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 122 .10 .05
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 673 .28 .13
Management of Companies and Enterprises 8 .38 .13
Administrative and Support and Waste Management 210 .20 .07
Educational Services 16 .25 .06
Health Care and Social Assistance 77 .25 .09
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 61 .12 .00
Accommodation and Food Services 79 .29 .06
Other Services (except Public Administration) 245 .19 .04
Public Administration 2 .50 .50
Total 3,051 .24 .08
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey baseline year (2004), two-digit NAICS 2002, unweighted.
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health insurance to its full-time employees is an increasing, curvilinear func-
tion of the number of employees in the business.13 Specifically, based on the 
partial slope estimate for the linear measure of size, each single-unit in-
crease in the number of workers at an establishment increases the odds that 
the business offers health care by a factor of about 1.35. While this increase 
is somewhat offset by the negative slope coefficient associated with the qua-
dratic size term, it nonetheless implies that adding three employees about 
doubles the likelihood that an employer offers a health plan. While this sup-
ports Hypothesis 1a, note that Model 1 includes no control variables and 
does not account for unobserved sources of variation at the industry level.
Model 2 in Table 6 speaks to Hypothesis 2a in which we argued that those 
new businesses with resource slack will be more likely to offer their full-time 
employees health insurance. Indeed, all four measures of resource slack—
profitability, competitive advantage, patents, and trademarks—are associated 
with an increased probability that health insurance will be offered to full-
time employees, as all four measures carry statistically significant odds ratios 
in excess of 1 (implying statistically significant coefficient estimates in ex-
cess of 0). Model 3 offers a test of Hypothesis 3a. It called for a positive 
13 Since the numbers displayed are exponentiated coefficients, or odds ratios, they carry values in the 
domain [0, ∞]. Therefore, an exponentiated coefficient less than 1 implies the associated raw coefficient 
is negative.
Table 6. Determinants of a New Business’s Likelihood to Provide 
a Health Insurance Plan to Full-Time Employees
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Number of employees 1.35*** 1.31*** 1.37*** 1.34***
(15.78) (13.88) (16.48) (14.46)
Number of employees2 .99*** .99*** .99*** .99***
(–9.60) (–8.23) (–9.81) (–8.43)
Profitable 1.64*** 1.58*** 1.57*** 1.50***
(8.28) (6.96) (7.47) (6.20)
Competitive advantage 1.41*** 1.26** 1.41*** 1.28**
(5.03) (3.16) (5.04) (3.26)
Patents 1.72*** 1.64** 1.67** 1.54*
(3.32) (2.77) (3.05) (2.31)
Trademarks 1.61*** 1.36** 1.64*** 1.44***
(5.57) (3.14) (5.56) (3.60)
ln(Government share 1.24*** 1.15*** 1.21*** 1.14***
 of total sales) (7.56) (4.72) (6.79) (4.13)
Age 1.27*** 1.03 1.27*** 1.03
(6.14) (0.74) (6.09) (0.58)
Age2 .97*** 1.01 .97*** 1.01
(–3.89) (0.63) (–3.94) (0.69)
Includes industry dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 17,579 17,630 16,034 15,893 17,579 17,630 16,034 15,893
Clusters  4,396  4,410  4,343  4,323  4,396  4,410  4,343  4,323
Notes: Shows odds ratios, statistical significance, and t-statistics for logistic regression models in which the 
dependent variable is whether a new business offered its full-time workforce a health insurance plan over 
the course of the previous calendar year. Estimates account for sample attrition, and standard errors ac-
count for intra-business correlation.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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relationship between the extent to which firms faced institutional pressures 
to provide health insurance to their employees, measured as the natural log 
of the percentage of sales attributable to public sector customers and with 
linear and quadratic time trends intended to capture the number of years 
the business has been in operation. The estimates in Model 3 support the 
hypothesis that increases in institutional pressures are associated with an 
increased probability that a new business will offer health insurance. The 
impact of the time trend is curvilinear, much like the relationship between 
size and the dependent variable in Model 1.14
As in Model 1, neither Model 2 nor Model 3 offers a simultaneous test of 
the impact of all of the independent variables on the likelihood that a new 
business offers health insurance to its full-time employees. Model 4 ad-
dresses this issue by simultaneously including the full vector of the indepen-
dent variables on the right-hand side. Not surprisingly, all of the t-statistics 
in Model 4 are smaller in magnitude than they are in the previous models. 
The impact of scale on the incidence of health insurance, however, remains 
strongly supported. The original results pertaining to resource slack emerge 
almost as strongly in Model 4 as they do in Model 2. The institutional mea-
sures, first included in Model 3, do not emerge quite as demonstrably as the 
scale and resource measures. On the one hand, the logged government 
share of a business’s receipts remains a statistically significant, positive pre-
dictor of the incidence of health care benefits. On the other hand, neither 
of the time trend terms maintains its statistical significance. Still, when con-
sidered collectively, we can reject the null hypothesis that institutional pres-
sures do not influence the dependent variable (F = 12.81, p < .0001).
While Models 1 to 4 offer support for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a, they still 
allow for the possibility that unobserved characteristics at the industry level 
14 By relying on a binary measure of profitability, we may be allowing measurement error in profitabil-
ity to bias upward the estimate for government receipts and to create the false impression of a positive, 
curvilinear relationship between business age and job quality. Unfortunately, the public-use version of 
the KFS data set does not include a continuous measure of profits or even of revenues or expenses 
(which would allow us to calculate a gross measure of gross margin). It does include an ordered categor-
ical measure of profitability, however, which we eschewed in the main analysis due to its lack of interpret-
ability, but that we use to check for robustness. When we re-run our estimates using the ordered 
categorical as opposed to the binary measure of profit, the estimates for government receipts do not 
change in any material way. Most critically, the coefficient on the government receipts variable remains 
significant at p < .001. With respect to the indication of a positive, curvilinear relationship between age 
and job quality, the ideal solution would be to estimate a fixed-effects (FE) model. Unfortunately, there 
really is no FE equivalent of a logit model as there would be for OLS, which is, in great measure, what 
precluded us from running one in the first place. We could, however, test this suspicion by relying on 
Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logit, though the conditionality requirement necessitates that all 
those businesses that never changed their benefits provision policies be entirely excluded from the anal-
ysis. Nonetheless, when we do this, either with the binary measure of profitability or with the more 
granular alternative measure, the linear and quadratic time trends measuring age retain their direction-
ality and statistical significance. Having done all this, given the limitations of the conditional logit and 
the alternative measure of profitability, we cannot completely dispose of unmeasured profitability as a 
potential source of bias, but we gain confidence that our results are generally robust in the directionality 
of the relationships.
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could be driving the results. For example, it could be that certain industries 
are more likely than others to offer jobs with benefits, and those businesses 
in these industries are disproportionately large, disproportionally well- 
resourced, or subject to a disproportionately high degree of institutional 
pressure. Models 5 to 8 are intended to preclude the confounding impact of 
industry heterogeneity by including on the right-hand side a full vector of 
two-digit industry codes. Aside from that, Models 5 to 8 are analogous to 
Models 1 to 4. In the aggregate, the estimates that include industry controls 
are qualitatively identical to those that do not. This implies that industry 
 differences are not driving the initial set of results. Furthermore, in the 
presence of the industry controls, the estimates can be construed as “within-
industry” estimates. Meaning, even relative to other businesses in the same 
industry, those new employers that are larger, better-resourced, and under 
greater institutional pressure are more likely than others to offer full-time 
employees some sort of health insurance plan. Nonetheless, as was the case 
in the absence of industry controls, the effects of age fail to maintain statisti-
cal significance in the presence of the other variables.
The eight models in Table 7 are analogous to those in Table 6, the only 
difference being that they test the hypotheses related to retirement benefits 
Table 7. Determinants of a New Business’s Likelihood to Provide 
a Retirement Plan to Full-Time Employees
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Number of employees 1.23*** 1.21*** 1.26*** 1.24***
(10.16) (8.65) (10.56) (9.10)
Number of employees2 .995*** .996*** .99*** .995***
(–5.48) (–4.71) (–5.88) (–5.23)
Profitable 2.15*** 1.94*** 2.00*** 1.80***
(8.86) (7.37) (8.06) (6.51)
Competitive advantage 1.29** 1.25* 1.32** 1.26*
(2.83) (2.25) (3.01) (2.37)
Patents 2.07*** 1.85** 2.09*** 1.76**
(3.51) (2.88) (3.61) (2.59)
Trademarks 1.48*** 1.27* 1.54*** 1.36*
(3.49) (1.98) (3.83) (2.49)
ln(Government share 1.31*** 1.23*** 1.27*** 1.20***
 of total sales) (8.17) (5.90) (7.27) (5.11)
Age 1.54*** 1.29*** 1.55*** 1.30***
(7.82) (4.22) (7.77) (4.23)
Age2 .95*** .97* .94*** .97*
(–5.44) (–2.32) (–5.49) (–2.44)
Includes industry dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 17,580 17,630 16,035 15,893 17,568 17,618 16,024 15,882
Clusters 4,396 4,410 4,343 4,323 4,394 4,408 4,341 4,321
Notes: Shows odds ratios, statistical significance, and t-statistics for logistic regression models in which the 
dependent variable is whether a new business offered its full-time workforce a retirement plan over the 
course of the previous calendar year. Estimates account for sample attrition, and standard errors account 
for intra-business correlation.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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or pensions. Indeed, the results support Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b. More-
over, the predictors retain their statistical significance even when included 
in a single estimate simultaneously and when introduced in the presence of 
two-digit industry dummies. In contrast to the results in Table 6, however, 
the two indicators of business age intended as a measure of institutional 
pressure continue to maintain their statistical significance even in the pres-
ence of the other predictor variables as well as the industry controls. There-
fore, the results offer strong support for the three pension-related hypotheses.
Discussion
These results are best understood graphically. All of the figures are founded 
upon the fully specified models inclusive of industry dummies, Model 8 in 
Table 6 and Model 8 in Table 7. Figure 1 presents fitted probabilities that a 
new employer offers its full-time employees health insurance (solid line) and 
a pension (dashed line) as a function of establishment size. All other vari-
ables are held at their sample means. While the likelihood of offering a re-
tirement plan is always lower than that associated with health care, both 
probabilities are highly sensitive to the number of employees in the work-
place. Given the curvilinear nature of the relationship, this sensitivity is even 
greater for the smallest businesses. With just one employee, the probability 
that a new employer offers health insurance is just .15. The same business, 
carrying all of the same mean values for the independent variables, will offer 
its full-time employees health insurance with a probability of .76 once it 
reaches 25 employees.15 Similarly, the “mean” business in the sample, con-
strained to just one employee, will offer a retirement plan only 7% of the 
time, which rises to 39% at the 25-employee mark. Suffice it to say, the val-
ues plotted in Figure 1 are consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Our data 
do not permit us to disentangle the many potential sources of scale effects, 
for example, efficiency wages (Rebitzer 1993; Fairris and Alston 1994), pro-
duction interdependence (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995), ILMs (Hollister 
2004), or something else. Nonetheless, our findings show that policies to 
boost job quality in new firms must address the actual or perceived high 
fixed costs associated with the provision of health insurance and pensions 
(Sels et al. 2006a, 2006b).
While the impact of relaxing resource constraints certainly pales in com-
parison to the impact of scale, the regression results clearly show that re-
source slack, too, drives job quality, even after accounting for scale. This 
finding is noteworthy, since the “all-encompassing” nature of scale has been 
shown to dampen the negative effects of resource constraints in wage stud-
ies (Knoke 1994). One reason may be because in a sample of new busi-
nesses, scale is less likely to be a proxy for, and therefore, less likely to be 
correlated with, resource measures, as evidenced by Table 3. Figure 
15 While 25 is within the domain of the scale variable, relatively few businesses in the KFS ever reach 
this size. In the final year for which we have data, just 78 businesses reported 25 or more employees.
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2 displays the marginal probability that each benefit will be offered as a 
function of each of the four binary variables used to measure resource slack. 
We already know that both health insurance and pensions are sensitive to 
whether a new business is profitable, is perceived to hold a competitive ad-
vantage, and is holding intellectual property in the form of patents or trade-
marks. The figure, again based on the estimates in Model 8 in Tables 6 and 
7, offers a sense of the magnitude of these effects. Recall that all of these 
differences are statistically significant. Using profitability as an example, 
consider the probability that the mean business in the sample will offer 
health insurance to its full-time employees. If the company is not profitable, 
it will offer health insurance with probability .26. If it reports a positive 
profit, that likelihood increases to .32. However, from Table 2, we know that 
fewer than half of the business-years in the sample benefit from this incre-
ment associated with profitability. The situation is even truer of patents. 
Those businesses holding at least one patent provide health insurance with 
.37 probability, whereas the 97% of the sample that do not report holding 
any patents instead offer health insurance with just .29 probability. Analo-
gous results obtain with respect to pensions. This finding suggests that while 
not of the same order of magnitude as scale, “resource poverty” (Welsh and 
White 1981) is a driver of job quality, as theorized in Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Those firms that have profits or the capacity to generate rents—be they 
Figure 1. Fitted Probability That an Emerging Business Offers Its Full-Time Employees 
Health Insurance and a Retirement Plan as a Function of Its Size
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Number of employees
Note: Fitted probabilities for health insurance and retirement plan derived from Model 8 in Table 6 and 
Model 8 in Table 7, respectively, with all non-focal independent variables held at their sample means.
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through competitive advantage (Porter 1980) or intellectual property—are 
more likely than others to offer high-quality jobs.
The finding that resource constraints attenuate the quality of jobs cre-
ated by new ventures sheds light on the interplay of employers and employ-
ment policy with respect to job quality. Intense product market competition 
and the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe 1965) present entrepreneurs 
with a conundrum. They can be “high-road” employers and increase their 
costs by providing fringe benefits, thereby risking failure; or, they can offer 
jobs of lower quality, just like their competitors. Indeed, Paul Osterman and 
Beth Shulman (2011) offer numerous examples of the precarious position 
in which “high-road” employers have been placed, in some cases forcing 
them to abandon the “high road,” and in other cases forcing them out of 
business altogether. More fundamentally, irrespective of which direction en-
trepreneurs choose, the mere fact that these costs must figure into the mar-
ginal calculus associated with making the initial founding decision may 
reduce the incidence of new venture formation relative to a situation in 
which these costs were borne by the public. Therefore, much like public 
investments in physical infrastructure that pave the way for healthy competi-
tion, similar investments to promote entrepreneurship and the innovation 
that arises from it—in the form of subsidized health insurance or state-run 
Figure 2. Fitted Probability That an Emerging Business Offers Its Full-Time Employees 
Health Insurance and a Retirement Plan, with and without Four Measures of Resource Slack
Profitability
Competitive advantage
Patents
Trademarks
Probability
Note: Fitted probabilities for health insurance and retirement plan derived from Model 8 in Table 6 and 
Model 8 in Table 7, respectively, with all non-focal independent variables held at their sample means.
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pension programs, for example—could well be justified on economic effi-
ciency grounds (Lerner 2009).
Institutional pressures were predicted to be positive drivers of job quality. 
With respect to health insurance, Hypothesis 3a, the evidence is mixed. On 
the one hand, the probability that a budding employer offers health insur-
ance is an increasing function of its share of sales attributable to public sec-
tor customers. This implies that those emerging businesses that are more 
visible to regulatory authorities, and thus, more highly exposed to norma-
tive pressures, are more likely to provide high-quality jobs (Oliver 1991; 
 Osterman and Shulman 2011). Figure 3, again generated by fitting values 
from estimates in Model 8 in Tables 6 and 7, illustrates this. The solid line 
depicts estimated probabilities for health insurance, where all variables ex-
cept the government share of receipts are held at their sample means. On 
the other hand, the estimates in Table 6 show that little if any discernible 
relationship is observed between the age of a business in the KFS and the 
likelihood that it offers health insurance, at least in our sample of new and 
young businesses. Hypothesis 3b emerges with more statistical support. In 
this case, Figure 3 again makes clear that increases in the public sector share 
of a business’s customer base are associated with increases in the likelihood 
that the employer offers a retirement plan. Furthermore, based on the esti-
mates in Table 7, the age of a business—from zero to five years old—posi-
tively predicts the likelihood that it will offer some form of a pension plan. 
Figure 3. Fitted Probability That an Emerging Business Offers Its Full-Time Employees 
Health Insurance and a Retirement Plan as a Function of the Public Sector Share of Its Receipts
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Government share of receipts, as a percentage
Note: Fitted probabilities for health insurance and retirement plan derived from Model 8 in Table 6 and 
Model 8 in Table 7, respectively, with all non-focal independent variables held at their sample means.
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In some sense, this squares with the notion that new firms will feel increas-
ing pressure to demonstrate legitimacy as they mature from start-ups into 
young firms. While the estimates associated with the time trend are in the 
hypothesized direction in this case, the practical import of age appears fairly 
small. That is, despite the statistical significance of the slope coefficients for 
age, age is of little economic significance. Holding every covariate steady at 
its mean, a new business in the KFS offers a retirement plan with .10 proba-
bility, a number that rises to .16 by its fifth year of operation. This is truer 
with respect to health insurance. Here, the probability increases from .28 to 
.33, on average, less than one percentage point per year. Put another way, as 
was the case with our discussion on resource poverty, the magnitude of the 
effect of institutional pressures on job quality is easily dwarfed by scale. Even 
at 0% government receipts and even in the year of founding, 55% of “large” 
employers in the KFS—those with 10 employees—offer health care. In con-
trast, consider a five-year-old business for which 95% of sales are to govern-
ment customers—both “extreme” values given the way institutional pressure 
is measured. If it has just three employees, the likelihood it will offer health 
insurance to its full-time employees is just 37%.
The finding that those new businesses serving federal, state, and local 
governments are more likely than others to provide health and retirement 
benefits suggests an important avenue for policy. Since health and pension 
benefits are structured on a constellation of public and private sector insti-
tutions, and the employment relationship is assumed to be the primary 
 provider of both health insurance and tax-qualified retirement savings, busi-
nesses that do not offer these benefits are not establishing sustainable em-
ployment relationships. Rather, the jobs they create impose an economic 
externality on society-at-large (Osterman and Shulman 2011). Procurement 
policies, however, can be used strategically to boost job quality. Our findings 
call for the establishment and enforcement of federal and even local stan-
dards for job quality, akin to the “prevailing wage” mandate promulgated on 
the federal level by the Davis-Bacon Act for construction workers and the 
McNamara-O’Hara Service Contracts Act for service workers, or equivalent to 
the “living wage” requirements that local governments often place on their 
contractors and on any businesses receiving taxpayer-funded financial assis-
tance (Adams and Neumark 2005; Holzer et al. 2011). Based on the evidence, 
when combined with an earnest attempt to share the fruits of government 
contracting with entrepreneurs, such policies would increase the probability 
that new ventures offer health and pension benefits without compromising 
their financial viability. Aside from the direct impact, such approaches could 
ultimately reshape employment norms by establishing or re-establishing 
higher standards for private sector job quality, beyond those specific busi-
nesses that trade with the government. These shifts are most likely to happen 
in industries dense with government business such as health and education, 
both of which happen to be replete with low-quality jobs (Osterman and Shul-
man 2011).
While Hypotheses 3a and 3b are only partially supported, perhaps an ad-
ditional lesson can be gleaned from the relatively weak evidence linking 
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business age to job quality. Specifically, a strong path dependency with re-
spect to job quality is observed. Indeed, relative to the quality of jobs created 
just as a business is established, relatively little improvement in job quality 
takes place over the first five years of the business’s life. That is, while busi-
nesses show some improvement, the true determination of job quality oc-
curs at the time of founding, consistent with the theory of “imprinting” put 
forth by Baron, Burton, and Hannan (1996).
Comparisons with Economy-wide Data
Figure 1 began to illustrate the importance that scale plays as a driver of job 
quality in emerging businesses. Its full impact requires a comparison of the 
results found here to broader, economy-wide data on benefits offer rates. 
We present comparative data from one such national source. The National 
Compensation Survey (NCS), produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) in the U.S. Department of Labor (DoL), provides comprehensive 
measures of benefit incidence, namely the share of establishments offering 
any form of health care insurance. The benefit is defined very broadly as it 
is in the KFS. The full sample includes about 17,500 establishments per year, 
of all sizes, and the survey results are weighted to account for sample prob-
ability and nonresponse. The response rate in the most recent year was 
about 70%.16 BLS field economists have collected the data from establish-
ments on an annual basis since 1996. Therefore, we can use the NCS data to 
construct benchmark time series for 2004 to 2009, the entire span for which 
we have KFS data.17
Figure 4, which focuses on health insurance coverage, plots a total of four 
data series—two based on the estimates presented above and two data series 
culled from the NCS. The solid line, based on NCS data, represents the 
economy-wide probability that an establishment of any size will offer a health 
care plan, by year, for the period 2004 to 2009. Note that the series hovers 
around .60, exceeding it in the years prior to the economic slowdown. The 
data series represented by the solid line is useful from a policy perspective 
and is thus presented here. Because the measure is not size-adjusted, how-
ever, it does not allow for a fair comparison to a data set of new, and there-
fore, generally much smaller businesses. A more suitable comparison is 
represented by the dashed line. It represents the share of establishments 
with one to five employees that offer any form of health care coverage. This 
is the smallest size category of establishments that that can be identified in 
the NCS. Note that over the 2004 to 2009 period, this series fluctuates in the 
range [.40, .46]. That is, it always exceeds fitted values from Model 8 in 
16 For more information on the National Compensation Survey, see http://www.bls.gov/ncs/home 
.htm (accessed October 1, 2011).
17 With respect to the NCS data, the “all establishments” series is published; however, the “1–5 employ-
ees” series is unpublished and was made available by special request. The Kaiser Family Foundation has 
also developed a rich panel data set useful for analyses like these. It employs the firm rather than the 
establishment as its unit-of-observation, however, making it less comparable to the KFS data. For more 
information, see Kaiser Family Foundation (2011).
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Table 6 when all of the variables are held at their sample means. These are 
represented by the dot-dash line which peaks at .33 in 2009. However, when 
these fitted values are size-adjusted such that all of the variables except size 
are held at their sample means—as they are in the dotted series, the series 
converges with the “all-workplaces” NCS data. In this case, with workplace 
size held at 10 employees, Model 8, estimated above, predicts that new busi-
nesses in the KFS, by their fourth year of operation, offer their full-time 
employees health insurance with the same probability as the average estab-
lishment of any size across the economy.
The dominance of employer scale as a driver of job quality in new busi-
nesses can also be seen by examining fitted values for retirement benefits in 
the context of broader, national data. Once again, the NCS canvasses for 
information on retirement plans, providing rich comparative data just as it 
did in the health insurance domain.18 Figure 5 plots these economy-wide 
data series for pension plan incidence along with fitted values from Model 8 
18 The National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), an organization that lobbies on behalf 
of small businesses, regularly surveys small-scale employers on a variety of topics related to small business 
performance and behavior. In 2005, it asked a sample of about 750 such employers, 698 of whom re-
sponded, whether their business sponsors a pension program for at least some of its employees. Of those 
firms with one to nine employees, 25.6% responded affirmatively. For more information, see NFIB 
(2005).
Figure 4. Probability That an Emerging Business Offers Its 
Full-Time Employees Health Insurance, over Time
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Note: National Compensation Survey (NCS) data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. NCS data on 
establishments with 1–5 employees are unpublished. The fitted values for the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) 
data derived from Model 8 in Table 6, with all non-focal independent variables held at their sample means.
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in Table 7. Analogously to Figure 4, the solid line represents the share of 
establishments of all sizes nationwide offering their employees any sort of 
retirement plan. It peaks at .51 in 2005 but never falls below .46 over the six-
year observation period. Once these data are size-adjusted, incidence rates 
from the NCS fall to as low as .28 in 2007 and 2008, again represented by the 
dashed line. When one compares those probabilities to fitted probabilities 
from the KFS data, with all independent variables including size held at 
their sample means—shown as the dot-dash line—one sees that new em-
ployers are much less likely than existing ones to provide their full-time em-
ployees with any sort of retirement benefit. Furthermore, even after 
recasting the fitted values for the KFS data by setting the number of employ-
ees to 10—illustrated with the dotted line—new employers barely exceed 
the observed economy-wide probabilities for establishments with just one to 
five employees.
The data suggest a strong distinction to be made between the com- 
parative analysis of health insurance incidence in Figure 4 and that of retire-
ment benefits depicted in Figure 5. With respect to health care, fitted values 
for new employers with 10 workers actually converge with national data on 
established employers of all sizes. With respect to retirement benefits, even 
KFS businesses with 10 workers—about four times the size of the mean firm 
in the sample—are essentially no more likely than established employers 
Figure 5. Probability That an Emerging Business Offers Its Full-Time Employees a 
Retirement Plan, over Time
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Note: National Compensation Survey (NCS) data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. NCS data on 
establishments with 1–5 employees are unpublished. The fitted values for the Kauffman Firm Survey 
(KFS) data derived from Model 8 in Table 7, with all non-focal independent variables held at their sam-
ple means.
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with just one to five workers—to offer pensions. Nonetheless, in both cases, 
the evidence is clear that scale drives job quality when job quality is defined 
by the incidence of these two benefits.
Our results are consistent with earlier economy-wide analyses of these 
benefits (Kalleberg and Van Buren 1996; Belman and Groshen 1998; 
 Hollister 2004). In contrast to received research on job satisfaction (Curran 
and Stanworth 1981), for example, these size effects persist even in the pres-
ence of industry controls. What is more, the evidence suggests that when 
new businesses create low-quality jobs, they do so because they start out 
small and do not grow. In a way, this finding is consistent with recent evi-
dence suggesting that most small businesses start and remain very small 
(Haltiwanger et al. 2011), sometimes, as a matter of choice (Hurst and Pug-
sley 2011). Collectively, Figures 1, 4, and 5 suggest that policies aimed at 
improving the quality of jobs created by entrepreneurs cannot ignore the 
impact of scale.
Limitations and Future Research
This study has a number of limitations, some of which evoke potential 
“next steps.” First, its use of binary dependent variables no doubt obscures 
a great deal of variation in the nature and generosity of the health care and 
pension plans offered by businesses in the sample. While the KFS data do 
not allow for a more finely grained measure, the likelihood that the health 
insurance coverage or retirement plans offered are more generous than 
those offered by established firms is slight (Brown and Medoff 2003). With 
respect to health insurance, for example, recent data show that workers in 
firms with fewer than 200 employees, on average, absorb higher deduct-
ibles for health coverage than do workers in larger firms (Kaiser Family 
Foun dation 2011). New employers are also far less likely than established 
employers to offer relatively generous defined-benefit pension plans (Beam 
and  McFadden 2001), in part because none of the new forms of retirement 
plans authorized by Congress specifically for small businesses are of this 
type (Purcell and Graney 2002). As a result, this study’s use of binary mea-
sures for benefits incidence assuredly leads to an understatement rather 
than an overstatement of the deficit in job quality attendant to new busi-
nesses.
Second, the study does not account for wages, which one could reason-
ably assert are the most fundamental element of job quality.19 While this 
issue should be particularly problematic for an economic conceptualization 
of job quality like the one employed here, and despite fundamental eco-
nomic theory to the contrary (Smith 1776 [1982]), studies focused on the 
impact of firm size or firm age on total remuneration suggest that wages and 
benefits move in tandem (e.g., Mellow 1982; Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff 
1990; Kalleberg and Van Buren 1996; Hamermesh 1999; Hollister 2004). 
19 For a detailed, empirical examination of job quality as assessed by wages, see Holzer et al. (2011).
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Larry Hunter (2000) reached a similar conclusion in his study of job quality 
in nursing homes, where an entire bundle of job quality measures cohered 
tightly. Brown and Medoff (2003) reasoned that the positive association re-
sults from the fact that firms that pay more are also more apt to seek out 
tax-advantaged forms of compensation, such as health care coverage or de-
ferred compensation. Also possible is that the theory of compensating wage 
differentials would hold if empirical studies could adequately account for 
unobservable characteristics of workers and workplaces.
In the case of the workplaces studied here, these unobservable workplace 
characteristics would likely come in the form of psychological rewards. As 
noted above, we deliberately excluded these elements of job quality from 
our analysis; however, one can imagine that those voluntarily opting out of 
employment at large, established firms into jobs in start-up companies de-
rive utility from increased autonomy (Herzberg 1968 [2003]; Hundley 2001; 
Shane 2003; Hurst and Pugsley 2011). While these newly created jobs fare 
poorly on the economic dimension, many of them would likely score quite 
well on a more psychologically oriented measure of job quality, one that 
captures constructs such as job enrichment, job satisfaction, and control 
over one’s own work (Heneman, Tansky, and Camp 2000; Tsai, Sengupta, 
and Edwards 2007). In the case of the KFS data, because high-technology 
ventures are oversampled, this notion is a distinct possibility.
One way to sort out this issue of unobserved, noneconomic facets of job 
quality would be to conduct qualitative interviews of employees and owners 
at the KFS firms to get a sense of whether these newly created jobs would 
score highly on these alternative measures. Indeed, the most comprehen-
sive measure of job quality would probably include a mix of economic, psy-
chological, and even sociological constructs, akin to the measure developed 
by Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater (1988). Therefore, one logical next step 
for this research program would be to conduct a large-scale, multilevel anal-
ysis of individual employees nested in a wide range of employment settings, 
using an instrument that includes the breadth of survey items required to 
construct this multifaceted measure of job quality. In addition to broaden-
ing our conceptualization of job quality and facilitating an examination of 
the ways that its psychological and economic elements co-vary, this exercise 
would help us address unobserved differences among workers—the supply 
side. To the extent that job quality is in the eye of the beholder, as Kalleberg 
(2011) argued, it could be the case that many of those workers holding the 
very jobs created by entrepreneurs in this study did not actually want or 
need health care or retirement benefits. For example, a person may be 
more comfortable “striking it out on their own” if they can access health in-
surance through their spouse or partner (Aldrich and Cliff 2003). To the 
extent this scenario is true, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to provide 
other benefits such as wages or autonomy in place of health insurance. Of 
course, as we noted earlier, even where this is true, one could reasonably 
question whether policy should place entrepreneurs in the position of hav-
ing to think strategically about whether to offer health insurance.
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The richness and the longitudinal nature of the KFS data also come with 
tradeoffs. That all of the firms are of the same cohort—started in 2004 and 
observed annually—no doubt purges the data of some sources of variation 
that could otherwise contaminate statistical estimates. For example, a one-
year-old firm might not feel the same degree of normative pressure to offer 
health insurance if it celebrates its first birthday in 2005 as opposed to 1975. 
The single-cohort design, however, also yields a data set without any inde-
pendent variation between firm age and calendar time. That is, all firms 
were one year old in 2005, two years old in 2006, and so on. Had macro-
economic conditions been reasonably stable over the observation period, 
then we could more credibly assume that the time trend was a reliable proxy 
for the age of the firm. As it turns out, we know that economic conditions 
worsened over the 2004 to 2009 period. Therefore, these forces cannot be 
ruled out as one source driving the curvilinearity of job quality as a function 
of time, nor can they be ruled out as a source of measurement error with 
respect to business age, yielding the weaker-than-expected results for Hy-
potheses 3a and 3b. Aside from the single cohort design, the sample is, of 
course, intentionally limited to 2004 start-ups, most of which are small rela-
tive to average-size workplaces in the United States. Therefore, while infer-
ring that larger, established firms are more likely to offer high-quality jobs is 
reasonable, this analysis does not allow us to make a ceteris paribus com-
parison unless we are willing to generalize well outside the age and size 
bounds of the sample. In short, we cannot hold firm characteristics and in-
dustries constant, and then examine the effect of age or size—across their 
entire continua—on the probability of a firm offering a particular benefit. 
Perhaps the best opportunity for doing this would be the National Establish-
ment Time Series (NETS) data recently employed by David Neumark et al. 
(2011) to address the job quantity question.
In addition to follow-up studies that broaden the job quality construct 
and the size and age range of firms sampled, we can begin to address other 
questions using the data we already have. For example, it would be interest-
ing to examine job quality as a driver of economic outcomes for new busi-
nesses. In particular, how does the quality of jobs created by new employers 
influence their likelihood of survival and their performance relative to 
other firms? Given the nontrivial failure rates of new firms (Carroll and 
Hannan 2000; Smith 2011), the examination could be motivated from a 
policy perspective. It could also be motivated by studies linking business strat-
egy, employment models, and outcomes for companies and their employees 
(e.g., Arthur 1992, 1994; Hunter, Bernhardt, Hughes, and Skuratowicz 2001; 
Hunter and Lafkas 2003; Batt and Nohara 2009), which, thus far, have con-
centrated mainly on the analysis of established firms. While these studies 
consider the intersection of product market and labor market forces, an 
additional stream of research could build on the emerging literature that 
considers how variation in a firm’s capital structure affects its behavior in 
the labor market (e.g., Clark 2009; Lazonick 2009; Bacon, Wright, Scholes, 
and Meuleman 2010). More specifically, does a new venture’s financing 
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choices impinge on the quality of the employment opportunities created by 
these new employers?
Given the importance of newly emerging firms as employers, this re-
search begins to address the bias that employment relations scholars have 
long held for large, established employers such as General Motors or 
Walmart, likely owing to the field’s roots in collective bargaining (Kaufman 
1993). Even for those who will continue to focus on more-established, 
larger employers, the study offers a rare look into the origin as opposed to 
the existence of jobs. This matters, because as we note above, an established 
employer generally begins as a start-up whose origins leave a lasting im-
print on its employment model (Baron et al. 1996), namely, the ways it ulti-
mately chooses to manage workers once it matures (Cardon and Stevens 
2004).
Conclusion
The reality is that most new businesses are more likely to have two to three 
employees, not 10 or 25. Furthermore, as reported in Table 3, most entre-
preneurs do not have slack resources, except for perceptions of competitive 
advantage, and most are not susceptible to institutional pressures. Conse-
quently, in the net, after accounting for numerous sources of variation, it 
becomes apparent that new businesses are unlikely to offer high-quality 
jobs, and the probability of their doing so increases only marginally over the 
employer’s first five to six years of operation. Relative to all other employers 
across the economy, new employers, challenged mainly by their small scale, 
are generally unlikely to offer health insurance or a pension plan to their 
full-time employees. As a result, Haltiwanger et al. (2009, 2011) were correct 
to shift the focus of policy recommendations from small firms to new and 
growing firms. We concur and add that policy solutions intended to encour-
age business start-ups need to be tempered with policies that encourage not 
only the long-term growth of these firms but also sustainable employment 
relationships that do not displace health and retirement costs onto society-
at-large. Consequently, while received research has made clear that entre-
preneurship drives job creation, particularly when one construes job 
creation from a purely quantitative perspective, this study grafts a qualitative 
dimension onto the job creation discussion and shows that by and large, 
new businesses generally do not create jobs that provide any form of a health 
insurance plan or a retirement plan. Those that do generally do so early in 
the business’s existence, as the year-to-year growth in probability is small 
relative to the marginal impact of movements in other predictors of job 
quality.
Nonetheless, one can argue it would be naïve to assert that entrepreneurs 
are simply choosing to be “low-road” employers. First, we theorize three or-
ganizational and production-related attributes expected to influence the 
probability that a firm provides its full-time workforce with health and pen-
sion benefits—scale, resource slack, and institutional pressures. We then 
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show that in a sample of new businesses, these variables, indeed, drive job 
quality as hypothesized. But, our findings must be considered in light of the 
fact that the mean organization in the data set, and by extension, most new 
businesses, are likely to score very low on these attributes. That is, they are 
likely to lack the resources required (or perceived by entrepreneurs to be 
required) to fund health benefits or a pension plan. Furthermore, they are 
unlikely to be subjected to the sorts of institutional pressures that would 
encourage them to offer generous benefits. But most critically, they are 
likely to establish themselves as small in scale and to remain small into the 
foreseeable future. The analysis above underlines the penalty to job quality 
associated with smallness. The effect of scale on the incidence of health care 
coverage and retirement benefits is undeniable, even in a data set limited to 
new, and therefore, generally very small businesses.
Keep in mind that not only have entrepreneurs been susceptible to the 
same market and institutional forces as other economic actors (Osterman 
and Shulman 2011) but also only recently and not by their own choice have 
they been labeled “job creators” and assigned a specific task with respect to 
economic recovery. What our study reveals is that in the current economic 
climate and under the current policy regime, entrepreneurs are not effec-
tively encouraged to create sustainable employment relationships in the 
form of high-quality jobs, where quality is defined in admittedly narrow, eco-
nomic terms.
While this study is only meant to establish a baseline understanding of 
the quality of jobs created through entrepreneurship, our findings should 
have immediate policy implications. Indeed, “small” businesses—those with 
fewer than 500 employees—constitute more than 99% of employing firms 
in the United States, providing jobs for more than half of all private sector 
employees.20 Similarly, in 2007, the last year before the present economic 
slowdown, (non-start-up) “young” firms—defined as being one to five years 
old—accounted for nearly 8 million of the 12 million new jobs added (Stan-
gler and Litan 2009). Although some see this as evidence that entrepreneur-
ial job creation is the key to eventual economic recovery, our analysis calls 
for a more cautious and more nuanced policy response than one that sim-
ply encourages job creation per se. While such policies would be a direct 
response to a troubling and very transparent headline unemployment rate, 
they would do little to address the more structural crisis in job quality that 
pre-dates and will likely outlast the present recession.
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